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INTRODUCTION
In a recent essay on what he identifies as “customary deviations”
from the dictates of the Internal Revenue Code, Professor Larry
Zelenak asserts that the Internal Revenue Service has regularly
created administrative deviations from the Code that produce
taxpayer-favorable results that cannot be challenged in the courts
1
because taxpayers lack standing to bring such challenges. He worries
that “the lack of any judicial check on unauthorized giveaways by tax
2
administrators threatens rule-of-law values,” and he concludes by
proposing “legislation aimed at retaining the practical advantages of
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1. See generally Lawrence A. Zelenak, Custom and the Rule of Law in the Administration
of the Income Tax, 62 DUKE L.J. 829 (2012) (evaluating administratively created customary
deviations from the Internal Revenue Code).
2. Id. at 833.
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customary deviations while assuaging rule-of-law concerns.” To
illustrate the customary deviations that he identifies, Professor
Zelenak analyzes the IRS’s announced decision not to take the
position that employee-retained frequent flyer miles earned on
employer-funded or business travel produce income when used for
personal travel by employees, but observes that other examples
abound.
As Professor Zelenak notes, we have devoted some effort to
exploring the gap between the expansive literal meaning of various
statutory and judicial definitions of income and the narrower meaning
4
that emerges from IRS policies and practices. Professor Zelenak’s
concern is that our view “stretches beyond the breaking point the
5
concept of what counts as an interpretation.” As he explains:
According to Professors Abreu and Greenstein, the statutory
definition of gross income (as glossed by Glenshaw Glass) “gives the
IRS the flexibility to navigate the shoals of social opinion regarding
income taxation, thereby . . . permitting the evolution of a concept of
income that serves . . . important values in taxation,” including “a
variety of noneconomic values.” This stretches beyond the breaking
point the concept of what counts as an interpretation. Nothing in the
language or legislative history of § 61, and nothing in Glenshaw
Glass, suggests (for example) that employee-retained frequent-flier
6
miles are not within the definition of gross income.

3. Id.
4. See generally Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 FLA. TAX
REV. 295 (2011) [hereinafter Abreu & Greenstein, Defining Income] (suggesting that the IRS
considers both economic and noneconomic values when applying the definition of income);
Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, It’s Not a Rule: A Better Way to Understand the
Definition of Income, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 101 (2012) [hereinafter Abreu & Greenstein, It’s Not a
Rule] (suggesting that standards are superior to rules in interpreting the definition of income).
5. Zelenak, supra note 1, at 836–37.
6. Id. (citing Abreu & Greenstein, Defining Income, supra note 4, at 300) (alterations in
original). Professor Zelenak goes on to observe:
Moreover, the IRS has never stated that frequent-flier miles are not within the scope
of § 61. In fact, the IRS’s most significant pronouncement on the topic—its 2002
announcement—implies the opposite when it states that “the IRS has not pursued a
tax enforcement program” with respect to frequent-flier miles and notes that “[a]ny
future guidance on the taxability of these benefits will be applied prospectively.”
Thus, far from claiming that its position is an interpretation of the statute, the IRS
acknowledges that it is not enforcing the law.
Id. at 837 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). But the most that can be said about these
IRS pronouncements is that they are ambiguous. Perhaps, as Professor Zelenak believes, the
agency is “acknowledg[ing] that it is not enforcing the law.” Id. Alternatively, the IRS may be
saying that it is not sure what the law is and is foregoing enforcement pending clarification of
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While there is actually much that the three of us agree about,
disagreement remains: What we view as interpretation, Professor
Zelenak views as deviation. A deviation requires identifying a clear
path (or rule) from which the deviation occurs. Professor Zelenak
7
finds that path in what he refers to as “the Code as written.” It seems
that, for him, the Code provides rules that are to be strictly
interpreted, so IRS positions that are inconsistent with that strict
interpretation are deviations. We offer a different analysis. We posit
that what may look like a rule can, upon closer inspection, reveal
itself to be a standard. Such a closer inspection involves consideration
of how the provision has been administered. In the specific case of the
8
definition of income under section 61(a) of the Code, we asserted in
Defining Income that both the IRS and the courts have treated the
definition of income as a standard rather than a rule, and that
acknowledging the provision to be a standard clarifies its non-linear
9
construction. If there is no rule that all accessions are income, there
is no need to find an exception or posit a deviation in order to
conclude that a particular accession is not income. In short, where
Professor Zelenak sees a deviation that threatens rule-of-law values,
we see a non-exceptional, fully lawful interpretation of a standard.
We do not claim that all provisions of the Code are standards. Many
are rules—but not the definition of income.
Professor Zelenak’s essay makes an important contribution by
clearly identifying a central concern regarding the IRS’s treatment of
income: respect for the rule of law. Professor Zelenak’s concern is
that
[t]o anyone who takes the rule of law seriously, it is troubling to
contemplate that the Treasury and the IRS are almost
unconstrained in their ability to make de facto revisions to the
Internal Revenue Code enacted by Congress, as long as those
revisions are in a taxpayer-favorable direction. It is especially
the law’s meaning. Or, perhaps, the IRS believes that employee-retained frequent flyer miles
are not income.
7. Id. at 840.
8. Section 61(a) provides that: “Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross
income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the
following items . . . .” I.R.C. § 61(a) (2012). The canonical definition of “gross income” comes
from Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). See infra note 31 and
accompanying text.
9. Abreu & Greenstein, Defining Income, supra note 4, at 346. See also Abreu &
Greenstein, It’s Not a Rule, supra note 4, at 103–04 (discussing the argument from Defining
Income that income should be interpreted as a standard).
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troubling to think that the relatively innocent customary deviations
in the gross income context may have bred a disrespect for the rule
of law on the part of the Treasury and the IRS, so that tax
administrators now believe they have the power and the authority to
disregard any Code section when doing so would further their
10
notion (not Congress’s notion) of good tax policy.

Addressing this concern directly allows us to refine our analysis
of the role of rules and standards in federal income tax law. For
Professor Zelenak, respect for the rule of law entails an obligation of
11
the Treasury and the IRS not to “disregard [the] Code,” i.e., to
follow the dictates of the statute. This, in turn, assumes that the Code,
properly interpreted, specifies the answers to questions about its
correct application—answers that Treasury and the IRS are bound to
follow. In other words, it assumes that the Code is properly read as a
compendium of rules whose meaning is independent of the
interpreter.
This Essay seeks to demonstrate that the interpretive use of
standards in applying provisions of the Code is not inconsistent with
the rule of law. Part I discusses the relationship between rules and the
rule of law and explains why we think so many tax scholars are drawn
to a view of the tax law as consisting primarily of rules. We then
demonstrate that the definition of income is properly understood as a
standard. Part II addresses the descriptive dimension of this claim,
summarizing and expanding our previous discussion of the definition
of income to determine whether the term is susceptible to
construction as a rule. We show that even a brief trip through some of
the litigation required to determine whether certain items are income
leads to the conclusion that the definition of income is not a rule. Part
III addresses the normative dimension of our claim. There, we tease

10. Zelenak, supra note 1, at 851. Professor Zelenak limits his definition of customary
deviations to taxpayer-favorable interpretations and worries about their potential corrosive
effect on rule of law values because a pro-taxpayer interpretation is effectively immune from
challenge, given that taxpayers directly affected would have no interest in challenging it and
others would lack standing to do so. Id. at 847–52. We agree that anti-taxpayer positions are
much more likely to be challenged—and indeed nearly all tax litigation consists of such
challenges—but we do not think that anti-taxpayer positions are fundamentally different from
pro-taxpayer positions for that reason alone. Anti-taxpayer positions will be challenged when
the amounts are large enough and the taxpayers are wealthy enough or have sufficient access to
free or low-cost representation to bring a challenge, but too often the Service’s assertion of an
anti-taxpayer position produces a compromise or capitulation by the taxpayer because of the
cost of mounting a challenge.
11. Id. at 851.
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out the functions served by interpreting income as a standard and
question where the interpretive authority lies with respect to the
Code in order to argue that income ought to be treated as a standard.
Part IV turns to several examples of what Professor Zelenak regards
as either a “disregard” or an “underenforcement” of the law to clarify
our understanding of interpretation. We then conclude by observing
that the Code does not “read itself”: Deciding whether a provision is
itself a rule or a standard is itself an act of interpretation. Moreover,
interpreting a provision as a standard is fully consistent with the rule
of law.
I. RULES AND THE RULE OF LAW
Exploring the connection between the rule of law and the use of
rules has occupied many scholars. One notable example is Justice
Antonin Scalia. Nearly a quarter century ago, in the context of
judicial decisionmaking, Justice Scalia linked the rule of law to the
12
use of rules, and the lucidity of his exposition and his explicit
discussion of the role of values make his analysis a particularly good
point of departure. Justice Scalia identified a set of values—rule of
law values—promoted by rules. He described one of these values as
13
“the appearance of equal treatment,” arguing that “equality of
14
treatment is difficult to demonstrate” when ad hoc evaluations of the
15
situation following from a “discretion-conferring approach” are the
basis for judgment. When two similar cases have opposite outcomes,
Justice Scalia argued, our “sense of justice,” is not satisfied by the
mere fact that the two cases are, in fact, different, but rather by their
16
being “seen to be so.” And application of “a clear, previously
17
enunciated rule that one can point to in explanation of the decision”
is more likely to address our desire for justice than is a decision
supported only by the totality of the circumstances.
A second rule-of-law value Justice Scalia identified is certainty.
“[U]ncertainty has been regarded as incompatible with the Rule of
Law. Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the law must

12. See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175 (1989) (analyzing the dichotomy between rule of law and judicial discretion).
13. Id. at 1178.
14. Id. at 1182.
15. Id. at 1177.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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have the means of knowing what it prescribes.” The rule of law
allows us to avoid punishment by conforming our conduct to the law’s
dictates. We would add, more generally, that the rule of law speaks to
our desire to assert some control over our lives by being able to
anticipate the legal consequences of our conduct—for example, by
making enforceable wills and enforceable agreements. Certainty,
Justice Scalia argued, is undermined by the “totality of the
19
circumstances” approach that is characteristic of standards. Rules
offer a better route to certainty and its cousins, uniformity and
predictability. Indeed, these values are so important to him that he
believes that “[t]here are times when even a bad rule is better than no
20
rule at all.”
Finally, again in the context of judicial decisionmaking, Justice
Scalia saw the use of rules as providing an “effective check upon
arbitrary judges . . . . Only by announcing rules do we hedge ourselves
21
in.” Indeed, this “check” on the power of government officials is
perhaps the most powerful of the rule-of-law values. And while
Justice Scalia was concerned with the power of judges, limiting the
power of the Executive is arguably even more important, given its
direct control of severe, even deadly, coercive power.
At the core of these three rule-of-law values—the appearance of
equal protection, certainty about what the law requires, and
constraining the power of officials—is predictability, and rules seem
to promise the desired predictability insofar as they involve, as
conventionally understood, ex ante resolutions of the various
competing considerations that the all-things-considered approach
22
associated with standards performs ex post. To use a favorite rulesstandards chestnut, a rule prohibiting speeds on the highway in excess
of fifty-five miles per hour seems to tell us in advance most of what
we need to know about what the law requires. By contrast, a standard
requiring prudent driving seems less predictable as it appears to leave

18. Id. at 1179.
19. See id. (arguing that adopting the “totality of the circumstances” test would signify that
uniformity is unimportant).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1180.
22. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. REV.
557, 559–60 (1992); David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860
(1999); David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths about Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 248 (2002);
David A. Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Anti-Tax Avoidance Doctrines, 4 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. (2002).
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much of the judgment to the post hoc assessment of some
decisionmaker.
It is hardly surprising, then, that there seems to be a strong
motivation to read the Internal Revenue Code as a compendium of
23
rules. People do not like paying taxes, by and large, and thus
demand that the Code be administered in a consistent and evenhanded way. No taxpayer wants penalty exposure, and even
compliant taxpayers do not want to overpay. All taxpayers, therefore,
24
expect certainty about what the tax law requires. Finally, there is a
long libertarian tradition in this country of distrust of government and
resentment of the taxing authority in particular (after all, the
Revolutionary War was motivated in large part by resistance to
taxation), so constraining the power of IRS officials seems
25
important. One way of capturing the confluence of these important
goals is to invoke what is perhaps the most salient characteristic of
our income tax system: the need of taxpayers to account, on an
annual or more frequent basis, to the government, on specific forms,
containing specific lines, requiring specific computations, involving
precise numbers. Reading the Code as a compendium of rules offers
the hope of just the kind of predictability that will serve this need.
The desire to read the Code as a compendium of rules supports,
in turn, the appeal of a “plain meaning” approach to statutory
interpretation. As Justice Scalia noted, “the extent to which one can
elaborate general rules from a statutory or constitutional command
depends considerably upon how clear and categorical one
understands the command to be, which in turn depends considerably
upon one’s method of textual exegesis. For example, it is perhaps
easier for me than it is for some judges to develop general rules,
23. As Professor Weisbach has observed, “The tax law is the paradigmatic system of rules.”
See David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, supra note 22, at 860.
24. See David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths about Tax Shelters, supra note 22, at 247–51.
Professor Weisbach argues that rules provide certainty because they specify “the law in advance
of taxpayers acting.” Id. at 247. He provides an excellent discussion of the relationship between
certainty, complexity, and compliance, and the use of rules or standards, which is consistent with
the well-documented connection between compliance, type of income, and third-party
reporting. See also Andrew Johns and John Slemrod, The Distribution of Income Tax
Noncompliance, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 397, 403 (2010) (noting that taxpayer noncompliance is
smallest with respect to items subject to third-party reporting to the IRS).
25. While a discussion of this subject is beyond the scope of this paper, we want to
acknowledge the competing view offered by historian Robin Einhorn, who has made the
compelling and provocative claim that American distrust of government and taxation is rooted
not in the value of liberty but in the legacy of slavery. ROBIN L. EINHORN, AMERICAN
TAXATION, AMERICAN SLAVERY 7 (2006).
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because I am more inclined to adhere closely to the plain meaning of
26
a text.” In short, the affinity between the plain meaning approach
and rules lies in the fact that both reflect the core rule-of-law quality
of predictability.
Our point is not that Professor Zelenak and Justice Scalia share a
full-blown jurisprudence. But they do share a devotion to the rule of
law, and both are attracted to interpreting statutory texts as rules to
promote rule-of-law values. Moreover, just as Justice Scalia finds that
the plain meaning approach advances that project, Professor Zelenak
asserts that the IRS has a duty to apply the Code “as written” and
that customary deviations, such as the failure to count employee27
retained frequent flyer miles as income, are violations of that duty.
28
But if we apply section 61(a) “as written,” does it really tell us
29
that employee-retained frequent-flier miles are gross income? Our
claim is that in order to answer that question, we must first determine
whether the definition of income is to be interpreted as a rule, or as a
standard.
II. INCOME AS RULE OR STANDARD?
In this Part we argue that the term “gross income” in section
61(a) has been interpreted as a standard. It is important to distinguish
this claim—a descriptive claim about what the law is—from the claim
we will make in Part III: a normative claim that the definition of
income should be treated as a standard. Here, we argue that the long
history of determining what items are included in “gross income”
reveals a consistent practice by the Internal Revenue Service and by
the courts of treating income as a standard. And we insist that a
consistent practice of treating income as a standard by those charged
with the administration of federal income tax law makes it a standard.
Put another way, the meaning of a provision of law like section 61(a),
including whether it is a rule or a standard, is not determinable at the
time of its promulgation; rather, its meaning emerges from the way
that it is regarded and used by those having interpretive and

26. Scalia, supra note 12, at 1183–84.
27. Zelenak, supra note 1, at 840, 844, 851.
28. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
29. In this Essay we adopt the practice of using the terms “gross income” and “income”
interchangeably.
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30

enforcement authority. Accordingly, we can determine whether a
provision like section 61(a) is a rule or a standard by examining that
historical practice.
Section 61(a) is famously circular. It defines gross income as “all
income from whatever source derived,” but does not further define
the term “income.” That task fell to the Supreme Court, which
defined income in Glenshaw Glass as “undeniable accessions to
wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete
31
dominion.” Following Glenshaw Glass, section 61 should therefore
be read to provide that gross income is “all undeniable accessions to
wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete
dominion from whatever source derived.” Given the breadth of this
language it is not surprising that both scholars and courts often talk
32
about the “all-inclusive language of § 61(a).” Yet, the only language
in section 61 itself that might be described this way is “all” and “from
any source derived.” Anything else has to come from what the Court
has defined as income, and an analysis of what the Court has defined
as income confirms that it has not sought to establish a rule. Rather,
in defining income, the Court in Glenshaw Glass and the other courts
that followed it, as well as the IRS, have made it clear that the
definition of income is subject to precisely the type of evolutionary
development typical of standards, rather than the rigid application of
a rule.
The dynamic evolution of the definition of income is revealed by
considering some of the litigation over what constitutes income. This
litigation includes Supreme Court decisions on issues such as whether
33
the “mere conversion of capital assets” produces income, whether a

30. See Richard K. Greenstein, Toward a Jurisprudence of Social Values, 8 WASH. U.
JURIS. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2516380.
31. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
32. MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 26
(12th ed. 2012); see also Zelenak, supra note 1, at 834 (noting “the sweeping language of I.R.C.
§ 61”); Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 432 (“The definition of gross income has been simplified,
but no effect upon its present broad scope was intended.”).
33. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 184 (1918). This case is an example of the
IRS standing firm in its position and fighting a losing battle through the court system. The IRS
began litigation and lost in the District Court. Mitchell Bros. Co. v. Doyle, 225 F. 437, 441 (W.D.
Mich. 1915). The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s ruling and denied the
IRS’s request for a rehearing. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 235 F. 686, 693 (6th Cir. 1916).
Ultimately, the Supreme Court agreed with the District and Circuit Courts. Mitchell Bros., 247
U.S. at 189.
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pro-rata stock dividend is income to a shareholder, whether payment
35
of an employee’s taxes by the employer is income to the employee,
36
and whether punitive damages are income. And indeed, this
evolution is so dynamic that the Supreme Court has come to opposite
conclusions on the very same issue: it concluded in Commissioner v.
37
Wilcox that embezzled funds were not income but then concluded in
38
James v. United States that they were. Other examples of the Court’s
39
difficulty of defining income abound. The lower federal courts have
34. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 199 (1920). The Supreme Court ruled against the
IRS in affirming the judgment for the taxpayer. Id. at 219.
35. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716, 720 (1929). This case began when the
Commissioner notified the taxpayer of deficiencies in his income tax resulting from a failure to
report the income received by payment of his taxes by his employer. The issue was heard by the
Board of Tax Appeals, which agreed with the Commissioner. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r,
7 B.T.A. 648, 652 (1927). The Court of Appeals reviewed and affirmed the Board’s decision.
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 33 F.2d 891, 891 (1st Cir. 1929). The Supreme Court
ultimately affirmed. Old Colony Trust, 279 U.S. at 731.
36. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 429. Here, the Tax Court agreed with the taxpayers that
punitive damages were not income. Glenshaw Glass Co. v. Comm’r, 18 T.C. 860, 872 (1952).
The taxpayers also won in the Court of Appeals. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 211 F.2d 928,
934 (3d Cir. 1954). However, the IRS won in the Supreme Court, which reversed. Glenshaw
Glass, 348 U.S. at 433. See also William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Comm’r, 19 T.C. 637, 641
(1953) (holding the opposite, but decided prior to Glenshaw Glass).
37. Comm’r v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 410 (1946). The long-running debate over whether
embezzled funds are income started in the Tax Court, which ruled in favor of the government
(income). On appeal, the decision of the Tax Court was reversed (not income). Wilcox v.
Comm’r, 148 F.2d 933, 935 (9th Cir. 1945). Finally, the government lost again when the Supreme
Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’s decision that the embezzled funds were not income.
Wilcox, 327 U.S. at 410.
38. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 222 (1961). The government won in the District
Court and Court of Appeals. United States v. James, 273 F.2d 5, 7 (7th Cir. 1959). It won again
when the Supreme Court overruled its previous decision in Wilcox and affirmed the lower
courts’ decisions, holding that embezzled funds are income to the embezzler. James, 366 U.S. at
222.
39. For example, in Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956), the IRS changed its
position several times on whether the bargain element in an employee stock option was income.
It litigated and lost the issue in the Tax Court, LoBue v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 440, 445 (1954),
then acquiesced in that decision, 1954 C.B. 2, but then withdrew the acquiescence, 1955-2 C.B.
10 n.9. It appealed and lost again in Commissioner v. LoBue, 223 F.2d 367, 371 (3d Cir. 1955),
but ultimately won in the Supreme Court. LoBue, 351 U.S. at 250. In United States v. Kirby
Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 2 (1931), where the issue was whether a corporation’s repurchase of its
bonds at less than the issue price generated income to the corporation, the Court of Claims
ruled in favor of the taxpayer, finding no income. Kirby Lumber Co. v. United States, 44 F.2d
885, 887 (Ct. Cl. 1930). The Supreme Court, however, reversed and found income. Kirby
Lumber, 284 U.S. at 3. In United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 590–91 (1951), the issue was
whether receipt of amounts in error produced income in the year of receipt even if the amounts
were returned in a subsequent year. The Court of Claims agreed with the taxpayer that there
was no income in the year of receipt, Lewis v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 1017, 1022 (Ct. Cl.
1950), but the United States Supreme Court reversed. Lewis, 340 U.S. at 592. In Edwards v.
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considered whether the following constitute income: meals and
lodging received by an employee and his wife for the convenience of
40
41
the employer; farm produce grown and eaten by the farmer or in42
store groceries consumed by the store owner; and amounts received
by a taxpayer from his lawyer to compensate for federal income tax
43
paid as a result of bad tax advice.
Though necessarily incomplete, this brief survey reveals that the
definition of income cannot be obvious. It requires much litigation to
discern and produces in the same case different conclusions by
different courts. Even the IRS has changed its position with respect to
the includability of amounts like the bargain element in stock
44
options and compensation for excessive federal income taxes paid as
45
a result of bad tax advice.
The long saga over the treatment of interest-free loans provides
yet another view of the evolution of the definition of income and the
interaction of the IRS, the courts, and the legislature in that
evolution. The IRS’s position evolved from asserting in a published
Cuba Railroad Co., 268 U.S. 628, 631 (1925), where the issue was whether subsidies paid by the
Cuban government to a U.S. corporation were income, the District Court ruled in favor of the
taxpayer. Cuba R.R. Co. v. Edwards, 298 F. 664, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). The Supreme Court
agreed and affirmed the earlier decision. Cuba R.R. Co., 268 U.S. at 633.
40. Benaglia v. Comm’r, 36 B.T.A. 838, 838–39 (1937). The Board of Tax Appeals
disagreed with the Commissioner and announced what became known as the convenience of the
employer doctrine, later codified in section 119. Id. at 841.
41. Morris v. Comm’r, 9 B.T.A. 1273, 1273 (1928), acq., VII-2 C.B. 75 (1928). In this case,
the Court ruled against the government in favoring the taxpayer’s position that the crops
produced on his farm for his personal benefit are not income to the farmer. Id. at 1281. The
government abandoned its previous position on the matter and acquiesced to the ruling. VII-2
C.B. 75 (1928).
42. Dicenso v. Comm’r, 11 B.T.A. 620, 620–21 (1928).
43. Clark v. Comm’r, 40 B.T.A. 333, 333–34 (1939), nonacq., 1939-2 C.B. 45, acq., 1957-1
C.B. 4. The IRS lost this case. Id. at 335. Here, the government and the taxpayer disagreed
about whether payment from the taxpayer’s tax practitioner for his error in computing the
taxpayer’s return should be considered a payment of taxes, as it would if governed by Old
Colony Trust, or compensation for loss of capital. Id. at 334–35. The Court favored the taxpayer
and ruled that there was no income to the taxpayer. Id. at 335. This proved to be another
example of the IRS changing its position on the matter, as it did not acquiesce to this decision in
1939, but nearly 20 years later, in 1957. 1957-1 C.B. 4.
44. LoBue, 351 U.S. at 250.
45. Clark, 40 B.T.A. at 333–34. Even the most ordinary business transactions raise
questions that require defining income. For example, if an enterprise facilitates a prospective
investor’s decision whether to invest by subsidizing the investor’s (and spouse’s) investigatory
trip, is that income to the investor? The IRS said yes; the District Court said no, Gotcher v.
United States, 259 F. Supp. 340, 345 (E.D. Tex. 1966); and the Court of Appeals split the
difference, finding no income with respect to the investor’s expenses, but income with respect to
his wife’s, United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118, 124 (5th Cir. 1968).
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ruling in 1955 that the “mere making available of money does not
46
result in realized income to the payee,” to litigating precisely the
47
opposite position six years later in Dean v. Commissioner and
numerous other cases. The issue was decided more than two decades
48
later by the Government’s victory in Dickman v. Commissioner and
the enactment of section 7872, which treats foregone interest as
income, or a gift, depending on the circumstances.
The items that caused the litigation in these cases are not
instances of bizarre types of accessions to wealth—marginal cases that
might be disputed in the application of any legal category. Rather, the
fact that they are subject to litigation, the variety of judicial opinions
49
with respect to the same item, and the changes to the IRS’s own
50
positions before and after litigation, show that the definition of
income is not patent. If employee-retained frequent flyer miles are, as
Professor Zelenak argues, a straightforward example of income, then
one might well think that embezzled funds are, too; however, Wilcox
involved a disagreement among the various federal courts that heard
46. Rev. Rul. 55-713, 1955-2 C.B. 23.
47. Dean v. Comm’r, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961).
48. Dickman v. Comm’r, 465 U.S. 330 (1984). Dickman addressed the gift tax aspect of
interest-free loans, but it was clear that if foregone interest were property of value so as to
constitute a gift, it would also constitute income when the loan occurred in a compensatory
context rather than in a donative context. Congress clearly agreed, since the legislative response
to Dickman, the enactment of section 7872, covers both types of loans. Id. at 338. See generally
Phillip J. Closius, Below Market Loans: From Abuse to Misuse—A Sports Illustration, 37 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 484 (1987) (discussing enactment of section 7872); H.R. REP. NO. 98-861, at
1011 (1984) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1445, 1699.
49. For example, in Lewis, the U.S. Court of Claims ruled in favor of the taxpayer, only for
the decision to be reversed by the Supreme Court. See United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 592
(1951). In Kirby Lumber, the taxpayer won in the Court of Claims, but lost in the Supreme
Court. See United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931). The Tax Court in Wilcox
agreed with the government, while the subsequent Circuit Court and Supreme Court decisions
were pro-taxpayer. See Comm’r v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 410 (1946). The taxpayers in Glenshaw
Glass won in the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals only to lose in the Supreme Court. See
Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 433 (1955). In LoBue, the taxpayers won in the
Tax Court and the Circuit Court, but lost in the Supreme Court, see Comm’r v. LoBue, 351 U.S.
243, 250 (1956), and the IRS changed its position along the way. Finally, though less
dramatically, in Gotcher the District Court found in favor of the taxpayers, while the Circuit
Court found no income in the case of one taxpayer but income in the case of the other, both
affirming and reversing the lower court decision. See United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118, 124
(5th Cir. 1968).
50. In LoBue the IRS initially acquiesced to the Tax Court’s pro-taxpayer decision, but
later withdrew its acquiescence and appealed the issue. See LoBue, 351 U.S. at 247. Although it
lost in Clark, the IRS acquiesced in the decision eighteen years later. See Clark v. Comm’r, 40
B.T.A. 333, 334 (1939). After losing in Morris, the IRS quickly acquiesced. See Morris v.
Comm’r, 9 B.T.A. 1273, 1281 (1928).
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51

the case, and James resulted in the Supreme Court’s overruling its
own fifteen-year-old precedent (Wilcox). The very controversy over
the inclusion of fringe benefits, which Professor Zelenak so
52
comprehensively describes, reveals the uncertainty: first, the IRS did
not seek to include the benefits in employees’ income; then, it
announced that it would include them; Congress disagreed; and
finally, a legislative enactment provided a compromise and some
53
certainty.
The project we began in Defining Income was initially motivated
by the need to understand why the IRS and the courts in so many
instances have failed to tax various accessions to wealth,
notwithstanding the absence of statutory provisions excluding those
accessions from the definition of income. This problem arises because
the introductory language of section 61(a)—“Except as otherwise
provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income from
whatever source derived”—is generally taken to mean that exclusions
54
from the definition of income require statutory authorization.
Consequently, interpreting the definition of income as a rule requires
justification for the creation of many exceptions for which no
statutory authority exists.
For example, although the IRS initially ruled that the retention
55
of unsolicited books by a book reviewer was income, it later changed
56
its position, ruling that receipt alone would not result in income.
After describing this, Professor Marvin Chirelstein asked, “Can the
Commissioner simply disregard the all-inclusive language of § 61(a)
when it suits him, and exclude what would otherwise be includable?

51. The Tax Court held that embezzled money was income, but the 9th Circuit and the
Supreme Court disagreed and found no income. See Comm’r v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 410
(1946). In James, a few years later, the District Court agreed with the government that
embezzled funds were income, and the Circuit Court and the Supreme Court also agreed,
although this required the remarkable step of having the Supreme Court overrule its fifteenyear-old decision in Wilcox. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 216–17 (1961). In
Glenshaw Glass, the IRS lost in the Tax Court and Court of Appeals but eventually prevailed in
the Supreme Court. See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 433 (1955).
52. Zelenak, supra note 1, at 842–44.
53. See Military Family Tax Relief Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-121, 117 Stat. 1335
(codified at I.R.C. § 132 (2012)).
54. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
55. Rev. Rul. 70-330, 1970-1 C.B. 14.
56. Rev. Rul. 70-498, 1970-2 C.B. 6.
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Answer: yes.” Implicit in Professor Chirelstein’s assertion that the
Commissioner was disregarding the language of section 61 is the
assumption that the language of section 61 and hence of the
Glenshaw Glass definition, must be read as a rule. We agree that if
“all accessions” inflexibly means “all” accessions, unsolicited samples
would come within the definition of income, and the IRS’s failure to
tax them would amount to an exclusion unsupported by statutory
authorization. But we believe that the language has not, need not, and
should not be so construed.
Consider the distinction drawn in Benaglia between wages paid
by a hotel to its on-site manager (gross income) and meals and
58
lodging furnished to that same manager (not gross income).
Although both were provided in connection with employment and
both benefitted the employee, as the court acknowledged (the meals
and lodging “may relieve [the employee] of an expense which he
59
would otherwise bear”),
only the former was deemed
“compensation.” And although both were provided by the employer
in order to further its business interests, only the latter was
characterized as having been furnished “solely for the convenience of
60
[the] employer.” Thus, applying the concept of income as a rule,
pursuant to which all accessions are income, does not support the
court’s distinction.
While treating section 61 as setting forth a rule does not explain
the court’s reasoning and decision in Benaglia or the IRS’s ruling with
respect to unsolicited samples, treating the definition of income as a
standard pursuant to which many factors are relevant, does. The
conclusions of the court in Benaglia and the IRS in the unsolicited
samples ruling reflect consideration of a variety of factors. For
example, as Professor Chirelstein has suggested with respect to
Benaglia:

57. MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 25 (11th ed. 2005). See also
CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 32, at 26 (discussing the different IRS approaches
determining whether or not the retention of unsolicited textbooks is income).
58. We are not the only ones who have questioned this. Professors Chirelstein and Zelenak
have made a similar observation: “The emphasis in Benaglia and in § 119 on the employer’s
convenience has been questioned by many writers.” CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 32,
at 20. They go on to provide a persuasive critique of the emphasis on the convenience of the
employer.
59. Benaglia v. Comm’r, 36 B.T.A. 838, 840 (1937).
60. Id. at 838.
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Perhaps, however, the “convenience-of-the-employer” rule is really
a short-hand way of acknowledging the factor of restricted
preference . . . . In Benaglia . . . , there is an element of personal
compulsion which raises doubt about the value of the benefit to the
recipient. Thus the hotel-manager must live on the hotel premises if
61
he is to do his job (or at least the court in Benaglia so found).

And, with respect to the unsolicited samples ruling:
On reflection, the Commissioner must have decided that the
administrative effort—identifying the textbook recipients
(thousands of school-teachers), persuading them that the books
were indeed “income,” placing a value on the books, and then
checking individual tax returns to be sure the correct amounts were
reported—was not worth the auditing expense that such an effort
62
would entail.

We agree that both the distinction made in Benaglia and the
conclusion in the unsolicited samples ruling reflect a variety of
important concerns, but our point is that precisely because of that,
neither can be said to flow from the text of section 61(a) “as
63
written.” And it is because such concerns cannot be ignored that it is
so difficult to define income.
Indeed, income is so hard to define that, in addition to the cases
that purport to set forth a definition (e.g., Glenshaw Glass,
Macomber) and decide the treatment of specific items (e.g., meals and
lodging and illegal gains), courts have felt the need to develop a
variety of doctrines to further limn the contours of the term.
64
65
Examples abound: claim of right, assignment of income,

61. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 57, at 21. See also CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 32,
at 21 (discussing possible explanations for “the convenience-of-employer” rule).
62. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 57, at 25. See also CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 32,
at 26–27 (discussing the IRS’s change of position on the textbook-income rule).
63. The tenuous nature of the distinction can also be seen in the Supreme Court’s decision
in Commissioner v. LoBue, in which the Court explicitly rejected the Tax Court’s reasoning that
the bargain element in an employee stock option was not income because the option was
granted by the employer to give the employee a proprietary interest in the business. Comm’r v.
LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 247 (1956).
64. See N. Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 424 (1932) (holding “[i]f a taxpayer
receives earnings under a claim of right and without restriction as to its disposition, he has
received income which he is required to return, even though it may still be claimed that he is not
entitled to retain the money, and even though he may still be adjudged liable to restore its
equivalent.”). See also United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 592 (1951) (finding that a taxpayer
cannot retroactively adjust tax payment in a previous year if repayment occurred in a
subsequent year).
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67

constructive receipt, constructive dividends, and so forth. Treating
the definition of income as a standard whose contours are shaped by a
variety of considerations provides a theoretically satisfactory
explanation for the decisions of the courts and the IRS, as well as for
the development of the doctrines that have come to be crucial in
determining the existence of income.

65. The assignment of income doctrine, treating amounts as income to the earner or owner
of property that generated the income was born in 1930 when the Supreme Court refused to
allow a valid contract to dictate the tax consequences of earnings, explaining, “[t]here is no
doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them and provide that the tax
could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skilfully [sic] devised
to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it.”
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114–15 (1930). See also Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 120 (1940)
(finding that when a father maintains control of bonds that he has purchased for his son and
merely transfers the coupon to his son, the father must pay the tax on the income from
coupons); Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426, 438 (2005) (finding that a litigant’s recovery
constitutes income to the litigant even with respect to the portion of the recovery due to the
attorney on a contingency basis); United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 457 (1973) (finding
payments into a retirement trust for a partnership are includible in gross income and taxable to
the beneficiary partners).
66. The doctrine of constructive receipt treats an amount as income when it is either
actually or “constructively” received:
Income although not actually reduced to a taxpayer’s possession is constructively
received by him in the taxable year during which it is credited to his account, set apart
for him, or otherwise made available so that he may draw upon it at any time, or so
that he could have drawn upon it during the taxable year if notice of intention to
withdraw had been given. However, income is not constructively received if the
taxpayer’s control of its receipt is subject to substantial limitations or restrictions.
Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (as amended in 1979). As the Tax Court has explained, “[t]he basis of
constructive receipt is essentially unfettered control by the recipient over the date of actual
receipt.” Hornung v. Comm’r, 47 T.C. 428, 434 (1967). See also Carter v. Comm’r, 40 T.C.M.
(CCH) 654 (1980) (finding a cash basis taxpayer has taxable income for the year in which his
wages were actually received because although they were due to him in the prior year, he could
not have obtained them in that prior year as a result of a bureaucratic mistake); Fetzer
Refrigerator Co. v. United States, 437 F.2d 577, 580 (6th Cir. 1971) (finding a controlling
shareholder constructively received rents due to him by the corporation because he had the
authority to draw checks for the company).
67. A constructive dividend is an item that was not in form a dividend declared by a
corporation but which is treated as a dividend for tax purposes: “It is well established that any
expenditure made by a corporation for the personal benefit of its stockholders or the making
available of corporate-owned facilities to stockholders for their personal benefit may result in
the receipt by the stockholders of constructive dividends.” Ashby v. Comm’r, 50 T.C. 409, 417
(1968). See also Dean v. Comm’r, 57 T.C. 32, 45 (1971) (finding that a corporation’s purported
loan was actually a constructive dividend); Stan Frisbie, Inc. v. Comm’r, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 440
(1990) (finding that the rent-free use of a corporate sailboat was a constructive dividend); Hood
v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 172, 182 (2000) (finding that a corporation’s payment of legal fees for its
sole shareholder’s criminal tax evasion litigation constituted a constructive dividend).
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III. STANDARDS AND INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY
If, as argued in Part II, the IRS and the courts historically
interpreted “gross income” as a standard, the question arises: Is that
proper? Accordingly, we turn here to the normative dimension of our
claim. In Section A, we identify two practical reasons why it is
important to interpret income as a standard: the need for the Code to
be able to address new and unanticipated forms of wealth, and the
need for tax law generally to respond to changing social needs, social
conditions, and social and political values. We then show that viewing
income as a standard best responds to values that animate the tax law.
In Section B, we assert that Treasury and the IRS have the initial
authority to determine whether a provision of the Code ought to be
interpreted as a rule or a standard, but that what is ultimately
desirable in tax law is a robust conversation among the three
branches of the federal government as to the meaning of the Code.
A. The Function of a Standard
Reflecting on the administrative and judicial difficulties
encountered in defining income reveals why the definition of income
must be allowed to evolve through the process of considering
successive disputes over what is and is not to be included within that
category. First, as in the case of all statutes, when enacting section 61,
Congress could not have possibly anticipated all the new phenomena
68
that might become candidates for inclusion as income. New and
creative forms of wealth not conceived of at the time of the Code’s
promulgation (employee-retained frequent-flier miles, for instance),
demand assessment as the future unfolds.
Second, tax touches virtually all facets of life. Hence, the number
of values relevant to determining answers to doctrinal questions in tax
69
law is great. The large number of relevant values, in turn, has critical
implications. Those charged with interpreting and applying the tax
law (administrators and judges) must be able to respond to current, as

68. Eric Solomon, The Process for Making Tax Policy in the United States: A System Full of
Friction, 67 THE TAX LAWYER 547, 556 (2014) (“The [Internal Revenue] Code is the
foundation of the U.S. federal tax system. However, it does not answer all the tax questions that
arise in a complex economy . . . . Because there are so many unanswered questions in the Code,
the Treasury Department has issued thousands of pages of regulations.”).
69. See Abreu & Greenstein, It’s Not a Rule, supra note 4, at 128.
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well as temporary, changes in conditions. Thus, for example,
empirical research suggests that judges are more likely to embrace
pro-government interpretations of the Code during times of national
emergency in order to serve the contemporaneously ascendant value
71
of raising revenue. Moreover, the effectiveness of tax law depends
on a perception of its legitimacy by both the public and Congress,
which requires that those charged with interpreting and applying tax
law be especially committed to getting it right. Hence, we have
described instances of the IRS reassessing and sometimes changing its
view about interpretations of the tax law (e.g., whether interest-free
loans generate income), and we have seen the same thing in the
72
courts (e.g., whether embezzled amounts are gross income).

70. Reflecting on the importance of keeping public officials from becoming insular when
carrying out their responsibilities to interpret the law, Eric Solomon has observed that although
the interchange of individuals between the government and the private sector can lead to the
unfortunate perception of capture or the acquisition of inside information, it is nevertheless
“beneficial because it enables government policymakers to understand current trends and
issues.” Solomon, supra note 68, at 554–55.
71. See generally NANCY STAUDT, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE PURSE: HOW COURTS
FUND NATIONAL DEFENSE IN TIMES OF CRISIS (2011). Professor Staudt observes that “the
Court has gone so far as to suggest that it has a role to play in raising the revenue necessary to
meet the nation’s wartime needs.” Id. at 2. Professor Staudt uses the Court’s own words to
support this assertion. In explaining the rationale for a decision in a World War II tax case the
Court explained that “we all realize it is necessary to raise every dollar of additional revenue
that can be raised without seriously disturbing or shattering our national economy.” Id. (quoting
Putnam v. Comm’r, 352 U.S. 82, 91 n.16 (1956)) (emphasis omitted). The quoted passage from
Putnam appears in the portion of the opinion in which the Court struggles to ascertain
Congressional intent. It is significant to us, as to Professor Staudt, that the Court considers the
explicitly stated revenue-raising objective in determining Congressional intent and ultimately
holding for the Government. Professor Staudt’s thesis that revenue needs affect judicial
decisions is further supported by the differing outcomes in two cases familiar to every tax
lawyer, Comm’r v. Court Holding, 324 U.S 331 (1945), and United States v. Cumberland Public
Serv. Co., 338 U.S 451 (1950). As she observes, “The justices considered Court Holding at a time
when the United States was fighting major wars against enemy states on several fronts, but
Cumberland emerged after World War II had dissolved into peacetime.” Id.
72. This distinguishes interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code from the usual
approach to interpreting statutes, which affords greater stare decisis effect to statutory
interpretation than to interpretation of the Constitution. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 77–78 (1938) (abandoning previous diversity jurisdiction approach because “the
unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made clear and compels us to do so”);
Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 540 (1948)
(discussing the power of the Constitution in overturning previous Supreme Court decisions); see
also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488–89 (1940) (adhering to precedent in light of
no legislative response); cf. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405–07 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (discussing how the Court has overturned its previous decisions on
constitutional grounds).
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Because of both the inevitability of unanticipated forms of
wealth and the need for the Code’s interpreters to be exquisitely
sensitive to social needs, changing conditions, and social and political
values, it is especially crucial that the meaning of income be open to
evolution. And that need suggests an explanation for the particular
textual structure of section 61(a) and its predecessors: Section 61 is
laid out in the classic form of ejusdem generis, i.e., it defines gross
income by setting out a list of examples, preceded by the words
“including (but not limited to) the following items.” Ejusdem generis
is normally taken by the courts as an invitation to define the term
case-by-case through analogy—by comparing a candidate for
73
inclusion within the term to the list of examples —and thereby
74
permitting the definition of the term to evolve and expand.
Classically, ejusdem generis imposes significant constraints on
interpretation. After all, it requires the use of a specific list as the
analytical starting point. Nevertheless, when interpreting the meaning
of income, courts often ignore the constraints of ejusdem generis. For
example, the criteria announced in Glenshaw Glass (“accessions to
wealth clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete
dominion”) are not supported by reference either to the Code’s list or
75
even to precedent. Indeed, the Court in Kirby Lumber explicitly
73. The classic illustration of employing the canon of ejusdem generis is McBoyle v. United
States, in which the Court was asked to decide whether a statute which made it a crime to steal
“an automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, motor cycle, or any other self-propelled
vehicle not designed for running on rails,” also made it a crime to steal an airplane. McBoyle v.
United States, 283 U.S. 25, 26 (10th Cir. 1931). Two lower courts, finding an airplane to fit
within the statute given that it is a “self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails,” had
upheld the thief’s conviction. See McBoyle v. United States, 43 F.2d 273, 275 (1980).
Nevertheless, a unanimous Supreme Court reversed. Applying the canon of ejusdem generis,
Justice Holmes considered what the enumerated items had in common and compared those
characteristics to those of an airplane. Concluding that none of the enumerated items “can be
supposed to leave the earth,” he concluded that an airplane was not the type of “self-propelled
vehicle not designed for running on rails” covered by the statute. McBoyle, 283 U.S. at 27. The
thief’s conviction was therefore reversed. Id. at 27.
74. E.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929) (citing § 213 of the
Revenue Act of 1916 to determine “[t]he payment of the tax by the employers was in
consideration of the services rendered by the employee, and was again derived by the employee
from his labor”); Morris v. Comm’r, 9 B.T.A. 1273, 1278 (1928) (“Products of a farm consumed
by the operator thereof and his family do not appear to come within any of the categories of
income enumerated in the taxing statutes and the administrative regulations of the
Commissioner.”).
75. See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (analyzing whether
punitive damage award constitutes income); see also Benaglia v. Comm’r, 36 B.T.A. 838, 840
(1937) (distinguishing an employee’s “compensation” (income) from an employee’s benefits
provided “solely for the convenience of his employer” (not income)).
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rejected the use of precedent, stating that there was “nothing to be
76
gained by the discussion of judicial definitions.”
If the courts are not always anchoring their interpretation of
gross income in the statutory list or in precedent, what then are they
drawing upon? Case-by-case determination is, of course, familiar
from the common law approach to developing the scope of doctrinal
standards. The meaning of, say, the common law standard of
“reasonable care” in tort law evolves through case-by-case
consideration of specific sets of facts. It permits the evolution of that
standard to proceed incrementally, responsive to changes in our
understanding of the values that define tort law. Similarly, the use of
this approach to define the scope of tax concepts such as income
permits the definition of those concepts to evolve incrementally in
response to the shifting social and political values that inform tax
77
law.
We developed the idea that standards are especially sensitive to
values in Defining Income, where we offered an account of the rulesstandards distinction. A field of law is constituted by a unique
78
collection of values. What these values are emerges and evolves
from the ongoing experience with answering important questions that
arise within the field. While a specific set of values will uniquely

76. United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931).
77. We see the fruits of this evolution in, for example, the amendment of the Code
following Kirby Lumber to add the category held in that case to constitute income—“discharge
of indebtedness”—to the section’s list of illustrative categories constituting the definition of
gross income and in the Treasury regulation that supplements the list, including the addition of
some of the items recognized as income in the cases mentioned above: punitive damages
(Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426), “[a]nother person’s payment of the taxpayer’s income taxes”
(Treas. Reg. 1.61-14(a) (as amended in 1993)), and illegal gains (James v. United States, 366
U.S. 213).
78. For a general discussion of the problem of defining a field of law, see Todd S. Aagaard,
Environmental Law as a Legal Field: An Inquiry into Legal Taxonomy, 95 CORNELL L. REV.
221, 226–51 (2010). Professor Aagaard notes that “it is useful to conceptualize a legal field as the
interaction among four underlying constitutive dimensions of the field: factual context, policy
trade-offs, values and interests, and legal doctrine.” Id. at 238. It is our contention that “values”
are fundamental in that they illuminate the relevant “factual context,” determine what count as
plausible and persuasive “policy trade-offs,” and shape “legal doctrine.” On this last point, see
our discussion of “aptness” in Abreu & Greenstein, Defining Income, supra note 4, at 325–33.
See also Einer R. Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field of Law?, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 365 (2006) (suggesting that the definition of a legal concept can be assessed by
its function in furthering multi-faceted goals and values); Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and
the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207 (1996) (discussing the benefit of developing
uniform principles in a field of law and then applying them to specific instances rather than
defining the field narrowly, around specific instances).
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constitute a particular field, some of the values might be shared with
79
other fields. Moreover, some values play a significant role in all
fields of law—that is, they are transcendent law values. They are
things important to law generally and include justice, administrability,
and the rule of law. The value of justice expresses a desire to achieve
the overall “best” answer to a legal question within a field; the value
of administrability captures the importance of the efficient and
effective functioning of each field; and as we have discussed above,
the value of the rule of law reflects a yearning for predictability.
To be successful, provisions of law within the field must promote
some set of values from among the universe of those that define the
80
field. The more values a provision promotes—the more questions
that must be answered to apply the provision and thus the more facts
that become relevant to answering those questions—the more the
81
provision will operate as a standard. Conversely, a provision that
promotes only a few of the constitutive values or that gives strong
priority to one value will make relatively few facts relevant and will
82
operate more as a rule.
In the case of tax law we have argued that a large set of values
constitutes the field. Some of these are economic values: revenue
raising and efficiency are especially important here. Some are values
having to do with the vertical and horizontal equity of the tax system.
Some are values having to do with public policy. This latter group of
values is important not only because our income tax law addresses
83
public policy by design, but because taxation has a potentially

79. For example, autonomy is a core value in both contract and tort law, albeit in different
ways. Similarly, community safety is a fundamental concern in the fields of both criminal
procedure and food-and-drug regulation.
80. We have called this quality “aptness.” See Abreu & Greenstein, Defining Income, supra
note 4, at 325–33.
81. It is this connection between apt provisions in a field of law and the collection of values
animating the field that provides the limiting principle for the all-things-considered analysis
typical of standards. The “things” that must be resolved to apply those standards are the facts
that must be determined by virtue of the relevant values.
82. We believe that rules and standards are not binary opposites but rather are idealized
ends of a continuum. Actual provisions will not be purely rules or standards, but will exhibit
varying degrees of each. See Greenstein, supra note 30, at 23–24 (making this point in terms of
the quality of “openness”). For purposes of the analysis presented here, however, it suffices to
speak generally of rules versus standards.
83. Here we are referring to tax expenditures, such as the home mortgage interest
deduction. We recognize that despite the persistence of the popular belief that the home
mortgage interest deduction was intended to and does promote home ownership, there is
substantial legal and economic scholarship that questions this popular belief and suggests that
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significant impact on just about every facet of our lives. Thus, for
example, we have argued that the American love of baseball is a
relevant value in deciding whether to regard baseballs caught by fans
84
at games as gross income.
The transcendent law values mentioned above—administrability,
the rule of law, and justice—appear to pull in different directions. The
complex bureaucracy, the need to file returns that can be completed
by taxpayers and administered by the IRS, the requirement of
85
information reporting by a large number of parties, our libertarian
traditions, and our historical resistance to taxation all make it hardly
surprising that taxpayers, tax professionals, and tax scholars are
attracted to interpreting the Internal Revenue Code as a
compendium of crystalline rules. Indeed, in many instances (e.g.,
section 63(c), the standard deduction provision) it is difficult to even
imagine reading the provision as anything other than a rule. But
justice seems to press in the other direction, urging interpreters of the
Code to take more values and more facts into account so that a
provision’s application in particular cases gives us the right answer.
That is, justice seems to suggest interpreting a provision of the Code
as a standard. On the other hand, the rule of law might pull us back
toward rules because predictability is so central to the rule of law and
rules, as Justice Scalia argued, are especially good for that.

the deduction increases the price of homes, rather than making home ownership more
affordable. See, e.g., Rebecca M. Morrow, Billions of Tax Dollars Spent Inflating the Housing
Bubble: How and Why the Mortgage Interest Deduction Failed, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
751, 771 (2012) (suggesting that the price of the deduction is not only the loss in tax revenue
without an evident increase in the rate of home ownership, but also the effective subsidy
provided to the real estate industry through price capitalization, which is “the increase in the
price of an asset due to the increase of value of an asset caused by a subsidy or incentive”);
Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History and Critique of the Tax Subsidy for
Mortgage Interest, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 278–79 (2010) (charging the deduction
with distorting “the cost of owner-occupied housing relative to other investments, resulting in
economy-wide misallocation of capital stock, artificially elevated housing prices,
overconsumption of large, expensive homes, and precariously high LTV ratios”).
84. See Abreu & Greenstein, Defining Income, supra note 4, at 339–44. Even the Supreme
Court has acknowledged baseball’s important status in American life. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407
U.S. 258, 266–67 (1972) (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1970))
(upholding antitrust exemption for professional baseball).
85. Indeed, information reporting is among the factors that have generated a huge market
in software that enables the relatively automated completion, filing, review, and audit of tax
returns. For a discussion of the connection between automation and rules, see Tom C.W. Lin,
National Pastime(s), 55 B.C. L. REV. 1197, 1213–15 (2014) (analogizing machines to rules and
humans to standards).
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In reality, however, these three values interact in complex ways.
Consider what happens if the desire to promote administrability and
the rule of law leads us to interpret a provision as a rule, but that
interpretation produces injustice, and that injustice, in turn, leads to
resistance and even noncompliance. Now we have neither
administrability nor the rule of law nor justice. Thus, the decision to
interpret a provision cannot be made by resort to one of these three
values alone.
Moreover, it turns out that all three of the transcendent law
values can support the use of both rules and standards. Justice, with
its emphasis on getting the optimal answer, presses toward
considering more of the relevant values and more of the consequently
relevant facts; hence, justice pushes toward interpreting a provision as
a standard. On the other hand, justice is also served by meeting
expectations—a task that rules perform especially well. Similarly, the
rule of law can be served by the use of both rules and standards. The
86
rule of law emphasizes predictability, and that pushes toward
interpreting a provision as a rule. On the other hand, predictability is
also achieved by the consistent application of the values that animate
the field—a task that standards perform especially well. Finally,
administrability emphasizes clarity and simplicity in the service of
predictability—a function served well by rules. But rules can produce
injustice, which can generate resistance, which can undermine the
efficiency and effectiveness that are the hallmarks of
87
administrability. Hence, both rules and standards can serve the three
86. As Justice Scalia argued, predictability gives the appearance of equal treatment,
suggests certainty about what the law requires, and imposes constraints on the power of
officials. See Scalia, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
87. An even closer look reveals that administrability is multifaceted and that these
different facets implicate a variety of different values. For example, Professor Douglas Kahn has
pointed out the “huge administrative difficulties” that would attend attempts to tax “an
exchange of services performed in a marital community.” Douglas A. Kahn, Exclusion from
Income of Compensation for Services and Pooling of Labor Occurring in a Noncommercial
Setting, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 683, 687 (2011). Some of these—what Professor Kahn identifies as
“valuation issues” and the difficulty of “discover[ing] the events where one spouse performed a
service for the other”—have to do with simplicity, predictability, and ease of application. Id.
Others implicate the “highly personal nature” of the services performed such that attempts to
tax those services would threaten “an invasion of privacy and an intrusion into an individual’s
private noncommercial life, and that would be unacceptable in a free society.” Id. at 687–88.
Such an untoward intrusion into taxpayers’ private lives would be problematical on its own. It
would also likely generate resistance and thereby undermine the operation of the tax system.
Similarly, consider the example of attempting to tax the fair market value of a caught
baseball. Here, administrability would be undermined by resistance caused by disrespect for the
important role of baseball in American culture, see CHARLES O. ROSSOTTI, MANY UNHAPPY
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transcendent law values, leaving it, as we argue in the next section, to
the interpreters of the law to decide whether a given provision should
be interpreted as a rule or a standard.
B. Who Decides?
The core of our claim is that nothing intrinsic to the Code
demands that we read its provisions as rules (or as standards). As
argued above, competing considerations present us with the choice,
and the choice is part of interpreting the Code. Hence, a crucial
question arises: Who has interpretive authority? More simply, who
decides?
Inevitably, Treasury and the IRS must initially interpret the
Code. Treasury has long had the authority to issue regulations
88
interpreting the Code, which were entitled to deference even before
the Supreme Court held that Treasury’s tax regulations are entitled to
89
Chevron deference. Moreover, the Court has explicitly recognized
“the primary authority of the IRS and its predecessors in construing
90
the Internal Revenue Code,” explaining that
Congress, the source of IRS authority, can modify IRS rulings it
considers improper; and courts exercise review over IRS actions. In
the first instance, however, the responsibility for construing the
Code falls to the IRS. Since Congress cannot be expected to

RETURNS 95 (2005) (noting the observation by White House spokesman, Mike McCurry, that
taxing Mark McGwire’s seventieth homerun baseball was “about the dumbest thing I’ve ever
heard in my life”), and by the impracticality of taxing each of the hundreds of thousands of
baseballs retrieved by fans each season, many of which (unlike McGwire’s record-breaking
homerun ball) have a vanishingly low fair market value, but at least some of which may
nevertheless have an ascertainable fair market value. And this is only the tip of the
administrability iceberg. Although we believe teasing out the constituent parts of
administrability is important to our project given the prominence of that concept in our
interpretive analysis, its precise contours are not directly related to the thesis of this article. We
will therefore refer generally to administrability in the text of this article without specifying the
particular way in which administrability is implicated.
88. See I.R.C. § 7805 (2012).
89. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011). As
between agency and judicial interpretations of the Code, Treasury’s interpretations are entitled
to strong deference from the courts. See id., applying the deference required by Chevron U.S.A.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to a Treasury regulation interpreting a
provision of the Internal Revenue Code. Whether Chevron deference only applies to
Regulations promulgated after notice and comment and not to less formal promulgations of
rules and policies (e.g., temporary Treasury regulations and IRB guidance), is a matter of
current debate. See generally Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L.
REV. 465 (2013) (discussing this point).
90. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596 (1983).
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anticipate every conceivable problem that can arise or to carry out
day-to-day oversight, it relies on the administrators and on the
courts to implement the legislative will. Administrators, like judges,
91
are under oath to do so.

As the Court observed, Congress can always determine the issue
by legislation—whether the IRS’s initial position is pro-taxpayer or
92
not. If Congress does not act, then a pro-taxpayer agency
determination remains because, as Professor Zelenak points out, no
one has standing to challenge it. Because interpretive authority is
shared among Treasury, the IRS, the courts, and Congress, no branch
necessarily has the final say. Rather, interpretation of the Code can
more resemble a conversation among the branches.
Consider the story of Evelyn Gregory. Mrs. Gregory owned all
of the stock of Monitor Securities Corporation. Monitor owned stock
in United Mortgage Corporation. A buyer wanted to buy the stock in
United Mortgage but the sale would have generated a large gain to
Monitor, subject to the corporate income tax. So Monitor did not sell.
Instead, Monitor transferred the stock of United Mortgage to a newly
formed corporation, Averill, and Averill issued all of its shares to
Mrs. Gregory. Averill then liquidated, distributing its only asset, the
United Mortgage stock, to Mrs. Gregory. That transaction did not
attract a tax at the corporate level, but it was taxable to Mrs. Gregory
and resulted in the United Mortgage stock having a basis (in Mrs.
Gregory’s hands) equal to its fair market value. Mrs. Gregory then
sold the United Mortgage stock to the buyer (at its fair market value),
resulting in no additional gain or tax. At the end of the transaction,
two important things had occurred: (1) Mrs. Gregory had the cash
received from the buyer, and (2) there had only been one level of tax
imposed on the gain, at capital gains rates to Mrs. Gregory. Had
Monitor made the sale directly, there would have been a tax at the
corporate level to Monitor, and when Monitor distributed the cash to
Mrs. Gregory, she would have had to pay a tax on that dividend at
ordinary income rates.
Mrs. Gregory took the position that Monitor and Averill
engaged in a reorganization. The statute provided that a

91. Id. at 596–97.
92. This is illustrated by the recent section 382 saga recounted by Professor Zelenak, in
which Congress did not agree with a pro-taxpayer position and reacted accordingly, overruling
the agency’s position by legislation. See Zelenak, supra note 1, at 845–48; infra notes 130–45 and
accompanying text.
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reorganization was “a transfer by a corporation of . . . a part of its
assets to another corporation if immediately [thereafter] . . . the
transferor or its stockholders or both are in control of the corporation
93
to which the assets are transferred.” The IRS disagreed with Mrs.
Gregory’s position. It argued that “the creation of the Averill
corporation was without substance and must therefore be
94
disregarded” and therefore, that Averill was not a corporation and
Monitor’s transfer of United Mortgage stock was not “a transfer by a
95
corporation . . . to another corporation.” The Board of Tax Appeals
rejected that argument. Mrs. Gregory won.
On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed with the Board that Averill
was a corporation and that the transaction meets the “dictionary
definitions of each term used in the statutory definition [of a
96
reorganization].” Nevertheless, Mrs. Gregory lost. Despite the literal
compliance with the words of the statute, Judge Learned Hand
explained,
[I]t does not follow that Congress meant to cover such a transaction,
not even though the facts answer the dictionary definitions of each
term used in the statutory definition. It is quite true, as the Board
has very well said, that as the articulation of a statute increases, the
room for interpretation must contract; but the meaning of a
sentence may be more than that of the separate words, as a melody
is more than the notes, and no degree of particularity can ever
obviate recourse to the setting in which all appear, and which all
97
collectively create.

The court held that there was no reorganization “because the
transactions were no part of the conduct of the business of either or
both companies; so viewed they were a sham, though all the
98
proceedings had their usual effect.”
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s judgment,
holding that literal compliance with the Code is not necessarily
99
sufficient. The purported reorganization was a “mere device” —an

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 112(i)(1)(B), 45 Stat. 791, 818.
Gregory v. Comm’r, 27 B.T.A. 223, 224 (1932).
Revenue Act of 1928, § 112(i)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
Id. at 810–11.
Id. at 811.
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
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“elaborate and devious form of conveyance masquerading as a
100
corporate reorganization, and nothing else.”
The Gregory litigation revealed that Congress had not said
enough, so Congress said more. Eventually the very language the
Supreme Court used to deny tax-free status to a “mere device”
101
became a part of the statute. The administrative agency further
102
interpreted it by issuing regulations to identify such “mere devices.”
The Gregory litigation and its aftermath illustrate the interaction
among the three branches of government in the interpretation of the
Code. The administrators are the first-order interpreters, either
through litigation or the issuance of guidance, but their interpretation
is neither the first nor last word on the subject.
For our purposes, the more fundamental point of the Gregory
saga is this: It has never seemed remarkable to characterize what the
IRS and the courts did in Gregory as interpretation, even though the
statutory provision contained an explicit definition of
“reorganization.” Likewise, it has not seemed remarkable that the
IRS interpreted the word “income” to include punitive damages or
meals and lodging provided by an employer or many other things.
Indeed, if the term “reorganization,” which has an explicit definition
in the statute, can be interpreted not to encompass transactions that
103
satisfy all the “steps” set out in the statute, then the term “income,”
which contains no such highly articulated definition, must perforce be
susceptible of interpretation. Our claim is that the IRS’s decision not
to treat employee-retained frequent flyer miles or caught baseballs as
income is as much an interpretation as its decision to treat punitive
damages or meals and lodging as income, or what Mrs. Gregory did as
104
not a reorganization. The only difference is that the former
decisions are pro-taxpayer, whereas the latter is anti-taxpayer.
100. Id. at 470.
101. I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(B) (2012).
102. The regulations provide that whether a transaction is a device depends on
all the facts and circumstances, including, but not limited to, the presence of the
device factors specified in paragraph (d)(2) of this section . . . , and the presence of
the nondevice factors, specified in paragraph (d)(3) of this section . . . . However, if a
transaction is specified in paragraph (d)(5) of this section, then it is ordinarily
considered not to have been used principally as a device.
Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(1).
103. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
104. Although we take this subject up directly elsewhere, we believe that the rule/standard
analysis explains IRS interpretations outside of the definition of income, including
interpretations in corporate taxation. For example, it seems to us that the rule/standard analysis
explains why the IRS has taken the position that family hostility should not be taken into
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As Professor Zelenak points out, a pro-taxpayer interpretation
will usually be invulnerable to challenge. But whether the taxpayer or
the government benefits from the interpretation does not affect its
105
character as an interpretation. For example, if the IRS decides that

account in applying the attribution provisions of section 318, (“the facts and circumstances of a
particular case cannot contradict the mechanical determination under section 318 of how much
stock a shareholder owns.”) Rev. Rul. 80-26, 1980-1 C.B. 66. The IRS position treats section 318
as a rule and doing so respects the dominance of the value of administrability that the provision
was designed to promote. Not surprisingly, the courts have been sharply divided. Compare
David Metzger Trust v. Comm’r, 693 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding family hostility does not
prevent the application of the attribution rules), Cerone v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1 (1986) (finding
family hostility irrelevant), Robin Haft Trust v. Comm’r, 61 T.C. 398 (1973) (finding family
hostility irrelevant), with Robin Haft Trust v. Comm’r, 510 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1975) (taking family
hostility into account), rev’g 61 T.C. 398 (1973), Rodgers P. Johnson Trust v. Comm’r, 71 T.C.
941 (1979) (hostility taken into account), Estate of Squier v. Comm’r, 35 T.C. 950 (1961) (taking
hostility into account), acq. 1961-2 C.B. 5, acq. withdrawn and nonacq. substituted 1978-2 C.B.
4). Similarly, the pro-taxpayer results in Granite Trust Co. v. United States, 238 F.2d 670 (1st
Cir. 1956) and George L. Riggs, Inc. v. Comm’r, 64 T.C. 474 (1975), acq. 1976-2 C.B. 2, are
easily understood as following from the judicial interpretation of section 332 as a rule (and the
rejection of the IRS’s attempted interpretation as a standard). Rev. Rul. 75-521, 1975-2 C.B.
120, shows that the IRS now agrees with that judicial interpretation. Gitlitz v. Commissioner,
531 U.S. 206 (2001), also presented an interpretive dispute, with both sides arguing that the
‘plain meaning’ of section 108(d)(7)(A) supported their desired result, but the IRS (and Justice
Breyer, in dissent) actually advocated a reading that had the virtue of “closing a loophole” and
in effect advocated a more standard-like construction. Gitlitz also provides an example of the
dynamic nature of interpretation, as Congress subsequently weighed in, amending section
108(d)(7)(A) to legislatively reverse Gitlitz. Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002,
Pub. L. 107-147, 116 Stat. 21 (2002). The so-called INDOPCO regulations can easily be seen as
revealing Treasury’s decision to interpret the term capitalization as setting forth a standard
within which safe harbor and de minimis rules provide some certainty; the iconic term “earnings
and profits” used in section 316 to define a dividend has no statutory definition and judicial
opinions have interpreted it as a standard, which appropriately allows the term to develop as
corporate finance and accounting evolve. See Bangor & Aroostoock R.R. v. Comm’r, 193 F.2d
827 (1st Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 934 (1952).
105. We agree that this is often the case, but of course, exceptions exist. For example, many
assumed that the Check-the-Box regulations would be invulnerable to challenge when they
became effective in January 1997 because their position was so pro-taxpayer. This assumption
proved false when taxpayers argued in subsequent litigation that in issuing the regulations, the
Treasury exceeded its authority to issue interpretive regulations. In Littriello v. United States,
Mr. Littriello was the sole member of an LLC that had not made an election under the Checkthe-Box regulations to be treated as a corporation. 484 F.3d 372, 374 (6th Cir. 2007). Under the
Check-the-Box regulations, this made Mr. Littriello’s LLC a disregarded entity and subject to
pass-through taxation. As a result, the IRS argued that when the LLC failed to pay the required
withholding and FICA taxes, Mr. Littriello was personally liable for those deficiencies. Id. Mr.
Littriello argued that the regulations were invalid and therefore the taxes could not be imposed
upon him, but the IRS won. Id. Since Littriello, the regulations’ validity has repeatedly been
upheld in analogous cases. See, e.g., McNamee v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 488 F.3d 100 (2d Cir.
2007); Med. Practice Solutions, LLC v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 125 (2009), aff’d sub nom.; Britton v.
Comm’r, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 19925 (1st Cir. 2010); Stearn & Co., LLC v. United States, 499
F. Supp. 2d 899 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
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employee-retained frequent-flier miles are not income (a protaxpayer result), it will be engaging in interpretation just as it did
when it decided that punitive damages are income (an anti-taxpayer
result). Whether an interpretation is pro- or anti-taxpayer is
independent of the act of interpretation. And even when the IRS
reaches a pro-taxpayer conclusion, Congress can weigh in, as it did
following the various section 382 Notices, which Professor Zelenak
describes, and which are discussed in Part IV.
IV. THE VARIETIES OF INTERPRETATION
In Custom and the Rule of Law in the Administration of the
106
Income Tax, Professor Zelenak identifies what he describes as “the
phenomenon of administratively created customary deviations from
107
the dictates of the Internal Revenue Code.” He distinguishes
customary deviations from three other phenomena that produce the
conclusion that certain accessions to wealth are not treated as income:
108
interpretations central to the “structure of the income tax,”
109
and
“mere
“dubious
protaxpayer
interpretations,”
110
He treats these conclusions as justifiable
underenforcement.”
exceptions to a general requirement that income be strictly
interpreted as a rule.
In Section A, we show that if we interpret income as a standard,
then the accessions discussed by Professor Zelenak are simply not
income, and there is no need to treat them as exceptions, which
nothing in the Code authorizes. In Section B, we move beyond the
definition of income to further clarify our approach to interpreting
the Code. We consider a dramatic example of an improper
interpretation: Notice 2008-83, which was issued by the IRS to give
guidance on the application of section 382 of the Code to banks
during the financial crisis. Both Professor Zelenak and we agree that
the Notice incorrectly interpreted section 382; we disagree, however,
with respect to why the interpretation was incorrect.

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Zelenak, supra note 1.
Id. at 832.
Id. at 834.
Id. at 832.
Id.
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A. Structural Interpretations, Dubious Interpretations, and
Underenforcement
The first phenomenon that Professor Zelenak distinguishes from
customary deviations is what he refers to as “a protaxpayer
interpretation of the Code that may seem dubious or even
insupportable in terms of the literal language of the Code, but which
would almost certainly be adopted by the courts if the IRS were to
reverse its position and taxpayers were to challenge the new IRS
111
position.” Professor Zelenak’s prime example is the “exclusion from
gross income of imputed income from services (that is, the value of
services one performs for oneself) and from property (that is, the
112
rental value of owner-occupied housing and consumer durables).”
His justification is that “[t]he exclusion of such benefits dates from
the dawn of the income tax and is so central to the structure of the
income tax that it is inconceivable that the courts would support an
113
administrative effort to reverse that exclusion.”
Professor Zelenak is not alone in concluding that imputed
114
income is not income—almost all commentators would agree, as do
we—but we take issue with the assumption that imputed income
should be thought of as an exclusion rather than as something that is
not income at all within the meaning of section 61. Construing section
61 as a rule leads to that conclusion because it arguably brings within
section 61 all accessions, including imputed income and even leisure
111. Id. at 833.
112. Id. at 834.
113. Id.
114. In a widely cited piece, Professor Donald B. Marsh suggests that imputed income is not
income so as to “balance the exemption of leisure income and thus to restore in a measure the
balance between work and leisure as alternative ways of using one’s time.” Donald B. Marsh,
The Taxation of Imputed Income, 58 POL. SCI. Q. 514, 520 (1943). He notes that because it
would be nearly impossible and impractical for the government to attempt to tax our leisure
activities, the government must, in the name of equity, exempt imputed income from taxation.
Id. Professor Dodge also agrees that imputed income does not constitute income because in his
view, imputed income does not represent an accession to wealth. Joseph M. Dodge, Accessions
to Wealth, Realization of Gross Income, and Dominion and Control: Applying the “Claim of
Right Doctrine” to Found Objects, Including Record-Setting Baseballs, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 685, 688
(2000). For a graphic and recent illustration of the administrative difficulties of taxing imputed
income, including managing public outrage and incomprehension, see Bruce Bartlett, Taxing
Homeowners as if They Were Landlords, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (Sept. 3, 2013, 12:01
AM),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/03/taxing-homeowners-as-if-they-werelandlords (note especially the blogged reactions to Bartlett’s discussion of the concept). See also
Bruce Bartlett, Taxing Medicare Benefits, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (Sept. 17, 2013, 12:01
AM),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/taxing-medicare-benefits
(providing
additional discussion on these administrative difficulties).
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and psychic benefits. But our project has been to question why that is
the only or even the best construction of section 61. Construing
section 61 as setting forth a standard to be determined after
consideration of the relevant values produces a better, more
transparent result than assuming the definition of income is an allinclusive rule: if it is a rule, the only way that imputed income is not
income is to exclude it, but no statutory authority for such an
115
exclusion exists. Construing section 61 as a standard, which permits
consideration of important tax values like administrability, provides
an explanation for the nontaxation of imputed income and thereby
avoids the need to distinguish it from employee-retained frequent
flyer miles. Under our construction, both items are not income as a
matter of interpretation by the agency charged with interpreting the
Code. They are the same in that neither is income as that term is
interpreted when it is viewed as a standard.
Professor Zelenak describes the second category as “mere
dubious protaxpayer interpretations of the Code by the Treasury
116
Department or the IRS.” His example here is a set of
proposed regulations issued in 1992, which would have extended the
exclusion of I.R.C. § 101(a) for life-insurance proceeds ‘paid by
reason of the death of the insured’ to ‘qualified accelerated death
benefits’ that are paid by an insurer to a terminally ill insured within
117
twelve months of the expected death of the insured.

Professor Zelenak distinguishes items in this category from
customary deviations in that these items purport to be the result of
interpretations (however erroneous they might be), while in the case
of customary deviations, the IRS is “simply conceding that it has no
118
intention to enforce the law . . . .”
Professor Zelenak’s discussion of section 101(a) suggests that
interpretation depends on ambiguity. For him, “by reason of the
119
death of the insured” is sufficiently ambiguous to leave room for

115. We assume that Professor Zelenak would put government transfer payments, which the
IRS has announced are not income under the general welfare doctrine (see Abreu &
Greenstein, Defining Income, supra note 4, at 308 n.50; Notice 99-3, 1999-1 C.B. 271), such as
Medicare and Medicaid, into this category as well, and not classify them as customary
deviations.
116. Zelenak, supra note 1, at 835.
117. Id. (citation omitted).
118. Id.
119. Id.
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interpretation, and while the interpretation reflected in the proposed
regulations might be “dubious,” he believes that it is nonetheless
interpretation because the ambiguity of section 101(a) of the Code
permits it. By contrast, Professor Zelenak takes section 61(a) to be
unambiguous and thus capable of being directly applied “as written.”
For all the reasons we discussed earlier, including the voluminous
litigation required to define income, we disagree. If we are correct
that the term “income” demands continual consideration and
120
interpretation, then customary deviations are interpretations.
More fundamentally, the ambiguity of a Code provision is not
the beginning of the analysis; rather it is part of the conclusion
reached when interpreting text. And because texts can be interpreted
differently, analysts can disagree about whether the text is
ambiguous. For example, it seems to us that Professor Zelenak
believes that the term “income” is unambiguous and, therefore, not
subject to interpretation; we disagree. By contrast, Professor Zelenak
appears willing to accept that section 101(a) is ambiguous and,
therefore, subject to interpretation, as former IRS Commissioner
Fred Goldberg and also former ABA Tax Section Chair James
Holden believed, although Professor Zelenak is troubled by the
121
interpretation made by Treasury. In this case it is Lee Sheppard
who disagrees: for her, “death” is unambiguous and not subject to
122
interpretation.
We do not claim that Professor Zelenak is being inconsistent in
finding ambiguity in one term and not in the other. Rather, we

120. Perhaps the following thought experiment will help to illuminate this point. Imagine a
regulation that took the position that employee-retained frequent flyer miles were not income.
Given the voluminous and sometimes contradictory history of litigation regarding the scope of
section 61(a), it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would find the regulation invalid on the
ground that the meaning of the term is unambiguous. (And despite the difficulty of challenging
a generally pro-taxpayer position it could be the case that a given taxpayer wanted income so as
to qualify for a greater tax benefit, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit, assuming the income
would qualify as earned income.) By contrast, it is difficult to imagine that the Court would
uphold a regulation that provided that banks were not corporations to which section 382 is
applicable.
121. Zelenak, supra note 1, at 835 n.25 and accompanying text (“[T]he section 101(a)
exclusion for payments ‘by reason of the death of the insured’ is broad enough to permit
payments made by reason of imminent death . . . .” (alterations in original) (citation omitted)).
122. Zelenak, supra note 1, at 835 (noting that “a prominent commentator sharply criticized
the proposed regulations as irreconcilable with the statutory language”). Professor Zelenak was
referring to Lee Sheppard’s observation that “‘[b]y reason of the death of the insured’ means
what it says—death.” Id. at 835 n.24 (citation omitted). Congress subsequently amended section
101 to essentially codify Commissioner Goldberg’s interpretation. See I.R.C. § 101(g) (2012).
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believe he is reaching different interpretive conclusions about
different provisions. And that is the point: Ambiguity is not an
123
intrinsic quality of a statutory text. Rather, ambiguity emerges from
context and use. For example, in the recent Mayo case, the Supreme
Court confronted the question whether the statutory term “student”
124
is ambiguous. The Court considered the particular context of
medical residency and concluded that in that context the meaning of
the term “student” was ambiguous. In many ordinary contexts, the
meaning of “student” is unambiguous and uncontroversial. But the
word does not define itself, and the Court could not apply the Code
“as written.”
The third category is what Professor Zelenak characterizes as
“simple underenforcement of the law without any indication (beyond
the mere underenforcement) that the IRS acquiesces in widespread
125
noncompliance with the Code.” His example is the 8 percent
126
requirement for information reporting of tip income. While we
claim that the items in Professor Zelenak’s first two categories result
from interpreting the definition of income as a standard, we agree
that underenforcement is completely different from interpretation.
We also agree that fully or partially failing to require the payment of
tax on a category of items that the IRS knows are income because it
chooses to allocate its enforcement resources to other matters is
different from treating the items as not income at all.
Still, it bears pointing out that the reasons for underenforcement
must relate either to the values that define the field of tax law or to
values relevant to the exercise of enforcement discretion in any field
of law. As a recent controversy demonstrates, focusing tax
enforcement efforts on a particular political group assumed to be
127
disfavored by the current Administration is unacceptable. And the

123. That is not to say that interpretations cannot be criticized as better or worse, just as Lee
Sheppard criticizes Treasury’s interpretation of “by reason of the death of the insured” as
mistaken. Zelenak, supra note 1, at 835 n.24.
124. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 710 (2011).
125. Zelenak, supra note 1, at 834.
126. I.R.C. § 6053(a), (c)(3)(A), (c)(4) (2012); Zelenak, supra note 1, at 834; see also United
States v. Fior d’Italia, Inc., 536 U.S. 238, 240 (2002) (allowing the IRS to estimate aggregate tips
received by restaurant employees when assessing FICA taxes on unreported tips due from the
restaurant rather than estimating each individual employee’s tip income).
127. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, Inappropriate
Criteria Were Used to Identify Tax-Exempt Applications for Review, 2013-10-053, at 5–9 (May
14, 2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201310053fr.pdf. In
mid-2013, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration reported that in considering
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straightforward reason is that such politically motivated action, if it
occurred, would find no support in the values that animate federal tax
law or, more generally, the exercise of enforcement discretion. By
contrast, the practice that Professor Zelenak points to—that “the IRS
is content to enforce the income tax on . . . tips subject to information
reporting [requiring an allocation of 8 percent of gross receipts to
certain tipped employees], without making a serious effort with
128
respect to the other half (roughly speaking) of actual tip income” —
129
serves the relevant tax value of administrability. While some tax
values (e.g., horizontal equity) might be sacrificed, the tradeoff
between accuracy and administrability can be plausibly accounted for
within the universe of relevant values. In this respect the IRS is not
acting in a way that differs materially from that of other
administrative agencies that routinely exercise “prosecutorial
discretion.” In sum, we agree with Professor Zelenak that what he
terms underenforcement is fundamentally different from
interpretation.
B. Interpretation and the Story of the Section 382 Guidance
An interpretation of the Code is an understanding of the
provision that can be justified by tax values. Whether it is correct or
incorrect is determined by its fate: A correct interpretation is one that
has achieved widespread (albeit provisional, or contingent),
acceptance. Conversely, an incorrect interpretation is one that is

applications for tax-exempt status, “the IRS used inappropriate criteria that identified for
review Tea Party and other organizations . . . based upon their names or policy positions instead
of indications of potential political campaign intervention.” Id. at 2. The result was widespread
public condemnation of the IRS and calls for firings, further investigations, and legal action.
While this summary of the “scandal” is merely just that, a summary, and not to be construed as
our beliefs on the matter, we do want to note in agreement that such a scandal could certainly
weaken the public’s trust in the impartiality expected from the IRS.
128. Zelenak, supra note 1, at 834; I.R.C. § 6053(a), (c)(3)(A), (c)(4) (2012); see also United
States v. Fior d’Italia, Inc., 536 U.S. 238, 240 (2002) (allowing the IRS to estimate aggregate tips
received by restaurant employees when assessing FICA taxes on unreported tips due from the
restaurant rather than estimating each individual employee’s tip income).
129. This observation does not depend on assumptions about people wanting to cheat. It is
simply unrealistic to expect that either employers or employees will be able to reliably and
consistently maintain the detailed records of ad hoc tips required to accurately calculate and
report this income. Adjusting IRS practice to such realities is a critical part of serving the value
of administrability.
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foreclosed by some combination of congressional direction, relevant
130
judicial decisions, history, and tradition.
The holdings of Gregory identify both correct and incorrect
interpretations of the Code proffered by the IRS. The correct
interpretation is the familiar one described above: literal compliance
with the terms of the Code does not suffice to make a transaction a
reorganization. But in the very same case the IRS offered an incorrect
interpretation of the statutory term, “corporation.” The IRS argued
that whether an entity was a corporation is to be measured by a
standard pursuant to which an entity incorporated under state law
would not be a corporation for tax purposes if it was incorporated to
avoid income tax. The government sought to treat such an entity as a
sham, but that argument was soundly rejected by the Board of Tax
Appeals and later by Judge Learned Hand, writing for the Second
131
Circuit, as well as by the Supreme Court. It has also been
132
consistently rejected by many other courts.
It is important to see that the IRS’s reading of “corporation” was
an interpretation, even if incorrect, because it was justified in terms of
the tax value of substance over form; the IRS sought to disregard
corporations that were formed exclusively for the purpose of tax
avoidance. The correct interpretation of “reorganization” was also
grounded in tax values—again, the value of having tax follow
economics so that particular tax consequences obtain only when a
transaction is economically significant, i.e., when it has economic

130. The account of correct and incorrect interpretation in this subpart summarizes a more
detailed discussion in Richard K. Greenstein’s Toward a Jurisprudence of Social Values, supra
note 30, at 9–12.
131. The Supreme Court confirmed that “[n]o doubt, a new and valid corporation was
created.” Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469–70 (1935).
132. See, e.g., N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Comm’r, 115 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[A]
corporation and the form of its transactions are recognizable for tax purposes, despite any taxavoidance motive, so long as the corporation engages in bona fide economically-based business
transactions.”); Weekend Warrior Trailers, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2011-105 (2011)
(“Even if a corporation was not formed for a valid business purpose, it nevertheless must be
respected for tax purposes if it actually engaged in business activity.”); Aiken Indus., Inc. v.
Comm’r, 56 T.C. 925, 933 (1971) (“[W]hile we agree with the petitioner that Industrias was a
‘corporation’ for purposes of article IX, and that it therefore cannot be disregarded, we do not
agree with the petitioner’s conclusion that this factor alone was sufficient to qualify the interest
in question for the exemption from taxation granted by article IX. Rather, we must determine
whether the transaction in question conforms to the other requirements established by article
IX.”).
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effects outside of tax. What made the IRS’s interpretation of
reorganization correct and its interpretation of corporation incorrect
was how the interpretations were received—i.e., which among the
variety of relevant tax values the courts saw as most important. In the
case of the definition of a corporation, the tax value of
administrability was taken to be more important than the value of
substance. Accordingly, courts have consistently refused to interpret
“corporation” as a standard and have not required taxpayers to
demonstrate a business purpose for corporate formation. Indeed,
134
today the classification is even elective. All this demonstrates that
the interpretation of “corporation” as a standard lacks widespread
acceptance and, for this reason, can be said to be incorrect. By
contrast, the interpretation of “reorganization” as requiring more
than literal compliance with the text of the Code has achieved
widespread acceptance, thus establishing that interpretation as
correct.
But sometimes an application of the Code cannot plausibly be
justified in terms of any tax values at all. Consider the story of the
section 382 guidance, discussed by Professor Zelenak. As he
succinctly explains:
Section 382 of the Code imposes strict limits on the deductibility of
corporate net-operating-loss carryforwards and of unrealized builtin losses, following either an acquisition of a loss corporation by
another corporation or a major change in the ownership of a loss
corporation. In September 2008, as Congress was considering a
massive bailout bill for the financial industry, the IRS of the Bush
administration made its own contribution to the bailout effort by
issuing Notice 2008-83, declaring—without making any attempt to
explain or justify its conclusion—that the § 382 limitations on the
use of built-in losses following an ownership change would no longer
apply to banks. The primary purpose of the notice appears to have
been the facilitation of the acquisition of failing Wachovia—by
Wells Fargo, as it turned out. Although the notice generated
considerable outrage in the media, among tax experts, and on
Capitol Hill, it achieved the desired result. Early in 2009, Congress
took the highly unusual step of enacting legislation specifically
disapproving of Notice 2008-83 as “inconsistent with the
congressional intent” and describing the legal authority for the

133. This concept is now codified in § 7701(o) to include both the existence of an economic
(non-tax) effect and a business purpose. See I.R.C. § 7701(o) (2012).
134. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (2006).
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notice as “doubtful.” The legislation, however, also declared that
taxpayers could rely on the notice with respect to ownership changes
135
occurring before January 17, 2009.

Professor Zelenak, like many tax experts and Congress, believes
that Notice 2008-83 is not only not a correct interpretation of the
Code, but that it is not an interpretation at all. We agree, but for a
different reason. Whereas Professor Zelenak believes that Notice
2008-83 is not an interpretation because it disregards the Code “as
written,” we believe that the Notice is not an interpretation because it
is not grounded in relevant tax values.
Section 382 as originally enacted in 1954 was a direct response to
the difficulty of policing trafficking in loss corporations with only
section 269, which permits the disallowance of tax benefits for
transactions made for the “principal purpose . . . [of] evasion or
136
avoidance of Federal income tax” and has been consistently
interpreted as a standard. By contrast to section 269, section 382 as
enacted in 1954 provided detailed criteria which denied the deduction
of a net operating loss if certain changes in the ownership of the
corporation occurred between the time that the loss was incurred and
135. Congress limited the effect of Notice 2008-83 in the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1261(a), 123 Stat. 115, 342–43 (2009)
(finding that the IRS lacked authority to exempt “particular industries or classes of taxpayers”
from section 382 and that the exemption in Notice 2008-83 was “inconsistent with the
congressional intent” with regard to section 382).
136. I.R.C. § 269(a) (2012). As Bittker and Eustice explain:
On the ground that § 269 had proved to be ineffectual as a weapon against the
traffic in loss corporations because it had required proof that tax avoidance was the
primary purpose of the transaction, in 1954 Congress enacted two new restrictions on
the net operating loss carryover. The first was § 382(a), applicable to changes of
ownership through the purchase of stock, which provided for the complete
disallowance of the carryover if, roughly speaking, 50 percent of the corporation’s
stock changed hands by purchase in a two-year period and the corporation’s old trade
or business was discontinued. The business-continuity requirement of § 382(a)
presented many factual difficulties and resulted in extensive litigation, with often
conflicting opinions that were difficult to reconcile. The second restriction was §
382(b), applicable only to changes of ownership to a tax-free reorganization, under
which the carryover was reduced proportionately if the old owners received less than
20 percent of the stock of the reorganized corporation (and was totally eliminated if
they received no stock). Neither restriction was dependent upon a showing of taxavoidance purpose; the function of both restrictions was to reduce or eliminate the
carryover in appropriate cases even though the transactions could not be brought
within the scope of § 269.
Desiring to combine the bifurcated approach of § 382 into a single regime and to
clear up various uncertainties, including especially the business-continuity test,
Congress amended § 382 in 1976.
BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 14.42[1] (2012). The 1976 amendments had a delayed effective date and
were eventually supplanted by the 1986 amendments, without ever having come into effect. Id.
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the time the deduction was to be taken. Subsequent amendments
137
refined the criteria and operation of the provision. Resort to motive
was abandoned and replaced by mathematically ascertainable
metrics.
The revisions to section 382 demonstrate the congressional
desire to move from judicial doctrines and statutory provisions whose
application depends on specific facts and circumstances to an
138
administrable, if very complicated, rule. Indeed, when it adopted
the current version of section 382 in 1986, Congress made plain its
139
intent to supplant a standard with determinable rules.
As Professors Bittker and Eustice explain, the history of section
382 makes it clear that the provision was designed
(1) to provide for tax neutrality on the disposition of corporations
that possess favorable tax carryover characteristics (i.e., to eliminate
both incentives and disincentives for the acquisition); (2) to limit the
use of corporate tax benefits generated under one set of owners to
the income attributable to the particular pool of capital that
generated those benefits; and (3) to provide objective rules that
could be applied and administered with greater certainty. With the

137. Prior to the 2008 Notice the most recent amendments had been enacted in 1986. The
1986 amendments were the only ones to take effect after section 382 was originally enacted. Id.
¶ 14.42[1]. Section 382 was first amended in 1976 to clarify the business continuity test and other
uncertainties, but delays to the effective date of these changes ultimately prevented their
implementation before the 1986 rewrite. Id.
138. See, e.g., Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382 (1957). See also BITTKER &
EUSTICE, supra note 136, ¶ 14.42, for a discussion of the original section 382, the enacted but
delayed 1976 amendments, and the ultimate adoption of the current version of section 382 in
1986.
139. The Conference Report specifically states that the conferees intended “that the Libson
Shops doctrine will have no application to transactions subject to the provisions of the
conference agreement.” H.R. REP. NO. 99-841 pt. 2, at 194 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4282. Libson Shops denied the use of net operating losses following a
merger under the provisions applicable before enactment of the 1954 Code. Libson Shops, 353
U.S. at 390. It was the uncertainty created by the standards-based facts and circumstances
analysis represented by Libson Shops and similar cases that provided the impetus for the
enactment of the first section 382 in 1954. BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 136, ¶ 14.46[2].
Commentators understood this and cheered, with Bittker and Eustice almost gleefully declaring
that in the 1986 revision of section 382, “the Libson Shops doctrine was finally interred.” Id. ¶
14.42[2]. Moreover, in affirming the continuing application of section 269 to the net operating
loss carryover provisions, Congress allowed the IRS to use the standards-based approach of that
provision to protect the fisc when appropriate while fostering administrability in most cases
through the enactment of clear, if complicated, rules.
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exception of a modification to the pool of capital approach, these
140
objectives were clearly evident in the final version of § 382.

Interpreting section 382 through the lens of this history would
have precluded the deduction by Wells Fargo of losses incurred by
Wachovia. By concluding that section 382 would not apply to banks,
Notice 2008-83 permitted those deductions, and made Wells Fargo’s
acquisition of Wachovia more attractive; the ability to deduct
Wachovia’s losses reduced the cost of the acquisition. The Notice
thereby encouraged the very trafficking in loss corporations that
141
section 382 was intended to discourage and prevent. Hence, the
position in the Notice—exempting banks from inclusion in the term
“corporation”—not only is unsupported by relevant tax values but
indeed contradicts them. Notice 2008-83 could not be an
interpretation of section 382 at all. In this we agree with Professor
Zelenak.
But Professor Zelenak goes on to contend that:
The recent § 382 notices should be troubling to anyone who values
the application of the rule of law to tax administration. One can only
speculate, but it is plausible that the § 382 notices never would have
142
been issued but for the precedent of the § 61 customary deviations.

In this we disagree with Professor Zelenak. The conclusion that
Notice 2008-83 is not an interpretation of section 382 does not require
the further conclusion that it is an affront to the rule of law. Respect
for the rule of law can be manifested by a variety of administrative
actions. These actions include interpretation but also include proper
exercises of enforcement discretion. Like a prosecutor exercising
prosecutorial discretion, administrative agencies have the authority to
143
decide whether and when to enforce the law. Just as a prosecutor
can decide not to charge a defendant with a crime in order to serve
the greater good (for example, by obtaining important information
from the defendant in exchange for non-prosecution), so the IRS can
decide not to apply a provision under circumstances where non140. BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 136, ¶ 14.42[2] (footnotes omitted).
141. This is the neutrality objective that was at the top of the list provided by Professors
Bittker and Eustice and which case law and commentary clearly show to be the dominant
motive behind restrictions on the deductibility of net operating losses following a change in
control. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 136, ¶ 14.42[2].
142. Zelenak, supra note 1, at 847.
143. See, e.g., Moog Indus. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 855 U.S. 411, 413–14 (1958); Fed. Trade
Comm’n v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244, 250 (1967).
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application would also produce a greater good. In the case of Notice
2008-83 we believe the IRS was doing precisely that: deciding that the
greater good to the economy from facilitating the acquisition of a
failing financial institution at a time of unexpected and severe
financial crisis justified not applying section 382.
In other words, if instead of thinking of Notice 2008-83 as an
exercise of the IRS’s interpretive authority, we think of it as an
exercise of the IRS’s enforcement discretion, the action can be
144
viewed as legitimate. We are not saying that an exercise of
enforcement discretion of this sort is necessarily uncontroversial; our
point is that the exercise of enforcement discretion can be consistent
with the rule of law. Accordingly, we think that the difference
between what the IRS did in issuing Notice 2008-83 and what
Professor Zelenak describes as permissible underenforcement with
respect to reportable tips is one of degree, not one of kind. Both may
be controversial and differ in the level of transparency with which
145
they are communicated, but neither violates the rule of law.
CONCLUSION
146

All
The Internal Revenue Code does not “read itself.”
applications of the Code require interpretation. It is, of course,
144. As Professor Zelenak also points out,
The Obama administration followed the Bush-era precedent, thus making protaxpayer administrative revisions of § 382 a bipartisan activity. The Obama-era IRS
issued several § 382 notices of its own, including, most prominently, Notice 2010-2,
which declared—again, without apparent support from the statute—that § 382 would
not be triggered if the Treasury Department were to sell its shares of General Motors
to the public. Although the notice attracted some sharp criticism, it remains in effect.
Zelenak, supra note 1, at 846 (footnotes omitted). Evaluating Notice 2010-2, 2010-1 C.B. 251, is
less clear-cut than evaluating Notice 2008-83. The latter could not have been an interpretation; it
could only have been an exercise in enforcement discretion. But Notice 2010-2 could be either.
The reasons for this are that it implicates another statute besides the Code, (the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, P.L. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765), the sui generis identity of the
seller (the Federal Government, a non-taxpayer, to which section 382 could not have been
intended to apply), the posture of the Notice as an announcement of the forthcoming issuance of
regulations, and the existence of different provisions dealing with stock acquired in bankruptcy
reorganizations (section 382(l)(5)). We will not engage in that analysis in this essay. However,
we will take up the larger issue of distinguishing interpretation from enforcement discretion in a
forthcoming article.
145. See supra notes 125–29 and accompanying text.
146. See Stanley Fish, Consequences, 11 CRITICAL INQUIRY 433, 446 (1985) (“The semantic
meaning of the text does not announce itself; it must be decided upon, that is, interpreted . . . .
In short, no text reads itself . . . .”). See also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 126 (2d ed.
1994) (“[Rules do not] provide for their own interpretation. The plain case, where the general
terms seem to need no interpretation and where the recognition of instances seems
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possible to anchor the interpretation of section 61 in language,
legislative history, or case law, and we do not deny that doing so is an
appropriate interpretive technique. But nothing requires that
interpretation stop with that. For instance, Learned Hand did not
limit himself to consideration of statutory language, legislative
history, or case law to conclude that what Mrs. Gregory did (which
appeared to track the statutory language precisely) did not constitute
147
a reorganization. He invoked purpose and context to reach this
conclusion—also an appropriate interpretive technique.
Given the requirement of interpretation, we have argued that the
IRS necessarily has the initial responsibility for interpreting the Code,
sometimes subject to judicial oversight and always subject to
correction by Congress. Part of that interpretive responsibility
permits Treasury, the IRS, and the courts (in the service of tax law’s
values) to treat a Code provision as a rule or a standard.
Some provisions of the Code are better interpreted as rules. For
example, the IRS has interpreted the statutory terms “marriage,”
“spouse,” “husband and wife,” “husband,” and “wife,” in accordance
148
with a rule that defers to the place of celebration for determination.
This makes sense because it provides certainty and prevents
government intrusion into very private relationships. On the other
hand, in the Gregory litigation, the Second Circuit and the Supreme
Court interpreted “reorganization” as a standard for all the reasons
149
previously explained.
Although we agree that the use of rules can serve the rule of law,
we believe that the use of standards is also fully consistent with the
rule of law. The rule of law requires predictability. What gives
predictability to decisionmaking within any field of law is the use of
the values that define the field to interpret and apply its judicial
doctrines, legislative provisions, and administrative regulations. The
IRS’s treatment of the definition of gross income as a standard
unproblematic or ‘automatic,’ are only the familiar ones, constantly recurring in similar
contexts, where there is general agreement in judgments as to the applicability of the classifying
terms.”); Richard K. Greenstein, Text as Tool: Why We Read the Law, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
105, 117 (1995) (“We read texts for many reasons . . . . The way that we use texts to achieve a
particular purpose is to interpret the text—that is, to determine the text’s meaning. Just as any
tool must be manipulated to be used, a text must be interpreted to be used.”).
147. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 811 (2d Cir. 1934).
148. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201 (Aug. 29, 2013).
149. See discussion supra section III.B. The courts disagreed with respect to the term
“corporation,” but both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court agreed with respect to
“reorganization.”
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illustrates this. Its decisions are not arbitrary. Rather, its
determinations of what qualifies as income are justified by the
values—both economic and non-economic—that animate the field of
federal income tax law. This approach to the definition of income
facilitates the definition’s evolution and has allowed the IRS to
address new questions that have arisen, involving caught baseballs,
employee-retained frequent flyer miles, bitcoin, and the like. These
interpretive decisions may be correct, dubious, or incorrect. In any
case, they are not “deviations,” but rather are legitimate exercises of a
shared lawmaking authority that is part and parcel of the rule of law.

